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ABSTRACT 
Modern malware and spyware platforms attack existing antivirus solutions and even Microsoft PatchGuard. 
To protect users and business systems new technologies developed by Intel and AMD CPUs may be 
applied. To deal with the new malware we propose monitoring and controlling access to the memory in real 
time using Intel VT-x with EPT. We have checked this concept by developing MemoryMonRWX, which is 
a bare-metal hypervisor. MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap all types of memory access: read, 
write, and execute. MemoryMonRWX also has the following competitive advantages: fine-grained analysis, 
support of multi-core CPUs and 64-bit Windows 10. MemoryMonRWX is able to protect critical kernel 
memory areas even when PatchGuard has been disabled by malware. Its main innovative features are as 
follows: guaranteed interception of every memory access, resilience, and low performance degradation.  
Keywords: memory protection; tracking memory access; information leakage; kernel integrity; hypervisor. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Modern malware attacks on Windows machines are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and extremely 
difficult to detect. Newest integrated security 
mechanisms on the modern Windows 10 x64 such 
as Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) and Kernel 
Patch Protection (KPP) also known as PatchGuard 
are unable to prevent malicious activity.  
Modern malware attacks are ‘surgical’ and infect 
networks of huge organizations even when their 
computers, have never been connected to the 
Internet – 'air-gapped' computers’ (Paganini, 2014). 
Let us consider some recent incidents with the 
following malware: Turla rootkit, which remained 
undiscovered for at least three years and 
ProjectSauron, which has never been stored on a 
disk. 
According to the security response by Symantec, 
Turla trojan which was created by the Waterbug 
hackers group successfully compromised more than 
4,500 computers from 100 countries (Symantec, 
2016). Even the Swiss Federal Department of 
Defense (GovCERT, 2016) was under a cyber-
espionage attack via Turla (Paganini, 2016). This 
malware remained undiscovered for at least three 
years due to its stealth features, which helped to 
overcome both built-in security Windows and anti-
virus signature based mechanisms. The authors of 
Turla rootkit proposed a new method to overcome 
Driver Signature Enforcement. A rootkit loads a 
legitimate signed driver and after that by using its 
vulnerability loads a malware driver. As a result, it 
defeats the Driver Signature Enforcement and 
makes it possible to load any kernel-mode driver 
even without any digital sign (G Data, 2014a; 
Rascagnères, 2016; Baranov, 2014). This malware 
hides its file system and registry activity by 
hooking the corresponding kernel-mode OS 
functions. To do this on a 64-bit system, malware 
bypasses PatchGuard without rebooting, which 
makes Windows kernel vulnerable to any 
manipulations again, such as Direct Kernel-mode 
Object Manipulation (DKOM) and hooking (G 
Data, 2014b).  
AV expert from McAfee has demonstrated the 
ability of KPP-Destroyer utility to defeat 
PatchGuard on modern Windows 8.1 x64, which 
makes Windows kernel vulnerable to common 
well-known rootkit techniques.  This tool has been 
used and improved by hackers (Intel, 2014; 
Rascagneres, 2015).  
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The authors underline that PatchGuard is 
vulnerable to kernel-level attacks because it is 
located in the same environment with rootkits (Yan, 
Luo, Feng, Pan, & Safi, 2015). The TDL4/TDSS 
rootkit family disables PatchGuard by modifying 
the system’s boot loader. 
Another malware platform for cyber espionage was 
identified by Symantec and Kaspersky Lab as 
ProjectSauron and according to their reports this 
malware had eluded security researchers for at least 
five years (Dockrill, 2016). This malware was 
deliberately created to confuse AV experts and to 
prevent its analysis. To achieve this, the indicators 
of compromise or patterns, which are normally 
used by AV experts, were removed. ProjectSauron 
also resides only in the computer memory without 
saving itself to the hard disk drive, which renders 
existing AV techniques pointless (Baranov, 2016).  
According to the paper (Prakash, Venkataramani, 
Yin, & Lin, 2015) “a kernel rootkit, can often 
tamper with kernel memory data, putting the 
trustworthiness of memory analysis under 
question.” These authors state “moreover, while it 
is widely accepted that value manipulation attacks 
pose a threat to memory analysis, its severity has 
not been explored and well understood.”  
These authors proposed improving the DKOM 
attack that targets the OS scheduler. They also 
showed that it cannot be detected by any of the 
existing techniques (Graziano, Flore, Lanzi, & 
Balzarotti, 2016; Graziano, 2016). 
Detection of malicious binaries with digital 
certificates is becoming increasingly difficult. 
Cyber security researchers keep sharing new 
techniques to overcome Windows security 
mechanisms (KMCS) in the recent Black Hat USA 
2016 conference (Nipravsky, 2016). The idea of 
infection of digitally signed files without altering 
hashes was based on inserting a payload code into 
the header attribute certification table. Because 
Windows excludes this field from the hash 
calculations, the file certificate remains valid. 
According to the recent McAfee Labs Threats 
Report (McAfee, 2016) the total number of 
malicious signed binaries increased by 3 million 
during the first 6 months of 2016.  
Experts from Kaspersky Lab have published   the 
newest set of malware tricks, which make it 
difficult to reveal malware (Bartholomew & 
Guerrero-Saade, 2016).  
The authors Jadhav, Vidyarthi, & Hemavathy 
(2016) prove that modern malware are prepared 
thoroughly enough to prevent their detection even 
by high skilled AV experts. Hackers “leave no 
signature, and so they never get caught. This 
happens due to the absence of signature or behavior 
information in the security systems.” At the same 
time, we are able to detect this new unknown 
malware because “in many cases evasive behaviors 
can be used as a signal for evasive malware 
detection.”  
Thus existing protection approaches of computer 
systems are no longer working. Driver Signature 
Enforcement cannot prevent installation of signed 
malware, PatchGuard is not resilient to malware 
counter-measures, modern AV products are unable 
to detect malware even for several years.  
The purpose of this paper is to present the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of a new 
hypervisor-based system that reliably provides 
privacy and integrity of memory data as well as 
giving behavior information on memory access in 
real time. To detect unauthorized memory access, 
we propose a new memory monitor system – 
MemoryMonRWX, which has the capability to 
track all memory accesses. 
Thread model. We will consider the following 
basic scenarios of malware attacks in the kernel-
mode:  
1. Stealing sensitive data, such as crypto keys 
and private users’ data. 
2. Manipulation with memory content, such 
as hooking, unlinking, and patching. 
3. Execution of unknown code fragments. 
Scenario 1. Malware reads the sensitive data from 
memory, such as private users’ data, cryptographic 
key, passwords, hashes, data and code of 3rd party 
drivers.  Recent research papers show the advance 
and importance of this topic. The way of extracting 
crypto keys from BitLocker is presented here 
(White, 2015). Thorough analysis of TrueCrypt 
utility and ways to retrieve user’s crypto keys are 
presented by Baluda et al. (2015). Security analysis 
of BestCrypt was carried out by Souček (2016), the 
data leaks issues has been revealed.  
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Moreover, kernel mode exploits usually read 
Windows kernel internals data, for example 
HalDispatchTable (Cardona, 2017). Hence there is 
a need to manage the access to this data as well. 
Scenario 2. Malware disables PatchGuard and 
illegally modifies the critical parts of system 
memory. Malware hooks functions by tampering 
System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT), hides 
OS-objects, such as process and drivers, by 
unlinking and patching corresponding structures 
from lists Sim & Lee (2016); Li, Wu, & Liu (2016). 
As a result, this involves memory modification of 
no less than 8 bytes for 64-bit OS. Rootkit can 
further protect this unlinked structure by 
overwriting its fields. So, this means no less than 
one-byte data modifications (Haruyama & Suzuki, 
2012).  
Malware can also hijack the kernel control transfers 
by Kernel Object Hooking (KOH), including the 
violation of control-flow integrity. For example, 
changing JZ to JNZ modifies one byte of code 
(Wang & Guo, 2016). 
Scenario 3. Malware deletes or modifies all 
information about itself from the system. As a 
result, there are only executable code fragments in 
the memory, which do not belong to any of the 
registered drivers. This idea was originally 
proposed by Korkin & Nesterow, 2016.  
To process all these scenarios for attackers, we 
propose the following logging scenarios. The 
visualization of malware attacks examples and the 
registered output are in the Figure 1 and Table 1. 
Logging Scenario 1. SyspiciousDriver.sys tries to 
steal sensitive data. To achieve this its code block, 
which is loaded to address ‘SourceAddr1’, reads 
the memory data, which is located on the address 
‘DestinationAddr1’. As a result, the output needs to 
register the following triple:  
‘SourceAddr1 – Read – DestinationAddr1’.  
Logging Scenario 2. The SuspiciousDrv.sys tries 
to hook a system table function. In this situation its 
code block, which is loaded to the address 
‘SourceAddr2’, writes to the memory fragment, 
which is located on the address ‘DestinationAddr2’. 
After this, the output will include the following 
items: ‘SourceAddr2 – Write – DestinationAddr2’. 
Logging Scenario 3. The HiddenDrv.sys hides 
itself by deliberately deleting all related 
information from the system lists. As a result, we 
have only executable code, which is loaded on the 
‘SourceAddr3’ in the kernel-mode memory. In 
order to detect it, the output needs to add the 
following entry: ‘SourceAddr3 – Execute – 
SourceAddr3’. 
 
Table 1 Example of preliminary output for 
revealing malware attacks 
# 
Source 
address 
Access 
Type 
Destination 
address 
1 SourceAddr1 Read DestinationAddr1 
2 SourceAddr2 Write DestinationAddr2 
3 SourceAddr3 
Exe-
cute 
SourceAddr3 
… … … … 
 
Figure 1 Examples of malware attacks in memory and the proposed log of the detection system 
 
 
System Tables
SuspiciousDriver.sys
Sensitive data
HiddenDriver.sys
Execution
SourceAddr1
SourceAddr2
SourceAddr3
DestinationAddr1
DestinationAddr2
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The following is required for solving the task:  
 for each memory access attempt, we need 
to log the following three items: source 
address, destination address, and type of 
accessing – read, write, or execute;  
 we need to specify two intervals: one for 
the source addresses and one for the 
destination addresses. The accesses from 
only these two intervals will be tracked;  
 the interval of addresses needs to support 
two values – start and finish addresses as 
well as only one value – a fixed virtual 
address;  
 the prototype needs to support the 
modern Windows 10 x64 and multi-core 
CPU. 
For the proposed memory monitoring system, we 
restrict CPU requirements with Nehalem 
microarchitecture (Wikiwand, n.d.), which 
supports both technologies Intel VT-x and Intel 
VT-x with EPT. 
This paper is in four sections. Section 2 focuses 
on the comparative analysis of the existing ways 
for logging memory access. In the first part we 
will analyze methods, which work inside an 
operating system: tracking memory management 
routines and the methods based on replacing page 
fault manager. The second part covers the 
analysis of hypervisor-based methods for tracking 
memory access. We provide a review of other 
recent papers and their ideas. At the end of this 
section we select the possible avenues for further 
development.  
The design of the proposed system 
MemoryMonRWX is presented in the third 
section of this paper. We describe the architecture 
and major components of this system. The details 
of interactions of major components in three 
cases on controlling read, write, and execute 
access are provided. To outline the advantages of 
MemoryMonRWX we present three demos: 
integrity case, confidentiality case, and an 
example of the analysis of real rootkit. We 
evaluate the benchmarks of MemoryMonRWX 
and demonstrate that the degradation of system 
performance is about 10%.  
Section 4 contains the main conclusions and 
further research directions. 
2. BACKGROUND  
In this section related papers are reviewed as well 
as existing prototypes according to the 
requirements previously mentioned. There are 
several hardware based solutions which are able 
to monitor memory access using FPGA 
programmable platform (Morgan et al., 2015; 
Lee, et al., 2013). These approaches are only 
applicable in the laboratory situation, because it is 
hard to distribute and upgrade them; so they will 
be omitted and instead the focus will be on 
software-based methods. 
All software methods for monitoring memory 
access can be divided into two groups:  first those 
based on operating system facilities and second 
those based on hardware virtualization 
technology – otherwise known as OS-based and 
hypervisor-based, correspondingly (Bauman, et 
al., 2015). The classification of these methods is 
presented in Figure 2.  
OS-based methods can be sub-divided into two 
subgroups. The first subgroup monitors memory 
access by tracking calls of memory management 
functions, while the second one applies handling 
page fault exception (#PF) by the Interrupt 
Descriptor Table (IDT) inside the OS. 
Hypervisor-based methods can be divided into 
the two subgroups according the technologies, 
which they are based on. The first subgroup 
leverages hypervisor facilities to handle page 
fault exception, the second subgroup applies new 
Intel VT-x with Extended Page Tables (EPT) 
technology to track memory access. The 
proposed MemoryMonRWX system is based on 
the EPT technology.  
Next all software methods will be analyzed and 
we will discover the most reliable and resistant 
method. 
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Figure 2 Classification of methods for monitoring access to memory 
2.1.  OS-based Methods  
In this section we will analyze methods, which 
work inside a Windows operation system and do 
not require any specific CPU support. Initially the 
focus will be on applying tracking memory 
management routines to monitor access to the 
memory. Next, we will deal with tracking 
memory access via marking pages as non-present 
and replacing the page fault handler. 
2.1.1. Hooking Memory Management Routines 
During the lifecycle of a kernel-mode driver 
several kernel mode objects or structures will 
have been added into the memory. During 
driver’s installation the corresponding structures 
are added into the system lists (Mayer, 2015); 
also a driver can allocate memory for its own 
purposes – all these manipulations can be tracked 
and used as a source to detect a malicious driver.  
One of the ways used to implement hooking 
functions is the rewriting of an address of 
memory allocation routine and applying 
trampoline function. 
The idea of monitoring the execution of an 
operating system and tracking the newly created 
kernel mode objects was proposed by Prakash et 
al., (2015). The authors suggested hooking 
memory allocation and deallocation routines in 
the kernel: ExAllocatePoolWithTag, 
ExFreePoolWithTag and MmLoadSystemImage 
from ntoskrnl.exe. Their ideas have been tested 
on 32-bit Windows XP with Service Pack 3 and 
Windows 7.  
A similar idea of capturing kernel mode object 
allocation and deallocation events to dynamically 
identify kernel-mode objects was also proposed 
by Rhee et al., (2010). The authors considered 
two basic types of malware attack: privilege 
escalation using direct memory manipulation and 
dynamic kernel mode object hooking. They 
emphasize that performance is not a primary 
concern for their prototype, which is designed for 
use in non-production scenarios such as honeypot 
monitoring, etc.  
The method of intercepting kernel-mode 
functions by using inline hooks in a stable 
manner on multi-cores processor systems was 
proposed by Milković (2012).  
It is also possible to hook kernel-mode functions 
by applying well-known techniques of modifying 
pointer values onto the System Services 
Dispatching Table (Matrosov, Rodionov, & 
Bratus, 2016) and using the Stealth Hook 
technique and Redirector Stubs to conceal 
hooking (Ligh et al., 2014).  
All these hooking approaches work well only on 
32-bit Windows OSes, while the more popular 
64-bit Windows include built-in Kernel Patch 
Methods for monitoring access to memory
OS-based
Hypervisor-based 
Leverages Intel VT-x with EPT technology
Hooking Memory Management routines
Handling Page-Fault Exceptions by IDT
Handling Page-Fault Exceptions by Hypervisor
Proposed system
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Protection or PatchGuard. According to the blog 
PatchGuard “is intended to protect critical kernel 
structures from being easily modified from 
unauthorized entities” (Block, 2015). PatchGuard 
also controls the integrity of Windows kernel, 
including ntoskrnl.exe (Irfan et al., 2013; 
Comodo, 2013). 
2.1.2. Handling Page Fault Exceptions by IDT  
This method is based on memory mapping on 
Intel x86 in protected mode. The idea of 
intercepting memory mapping process using IDT 
for rootkit purposes was first presented by Sparks 
& Butler (2005). Below we will discuss the 
details of memory mapping process and how to 
apply them to monitor memory access. We will 
provide three scenarios of trapping memory 
access and also cover with the disadvantages of 
this methodology.  
The process of memory mapping or memory 
paging is explained by Intel (2016) and includes 
the following phases. When a memory access to 
the page occurs, a CPU starts page table walk to 
find the physical address. CPU then checks the 
access type by reading corresponding Page Table 
Entry (PTE) status bits. If the page is valid 
(meaning that its bits are set) and there is no 
conflict with the access type, the CPU then 
calculates the corresponding physical address of 
the page, using the page frame number (PFN) 
from this PTE.  
This is a frequent scenario. However, the access 
violation case is also possible: according to the 
Windows source code “the access fault was 
detected due to either an access violation, a PTE 
with the present bit clear, or a valid PTE with the 
dirty bit clear and a write operation” (Microsoft, 
n.d.-a). In this situation after checking PTE bits, 
the CPU raises a page fault exception (#PF). 
Following this the control goes to the page fault 
handler code, whose address is located in the 
IDT. The example of the source code of the page 
fault handler code is presented in the function 
nt!KiTrap0E within the file Microsoft (n.d.-b). 
This code processes all the required work for 
loading memory pages, configuring PTEs and 
continue control to the OS.  
Sparks and Butler proposed hiding of the memory 
page by deliberately marking corresponding PTE 
as non-present and also by replacing the page 
fault handler code, which helps to differentiate 
page view. This method can be applied to 
monitoring memory access as well. Figure 3 
shows the principles of tracking memory access.  
Let us consider the case of secret data protection 
from unauthorized access. Secret data is located 
on page C. To do this we change the 
corresponding page table entry by clearing the 
Present bit (P bit). Once an unknown driver 
’Drv.sys’, has been loaded on page A and page B, 
and tries to read the secret data, CPU starts 
memory translation to retrieve the content of page 
C. To achieve this CPU reads the Page C PTE 
and checks if the result is in conflict with the 
access type. In our case we have access violation: 
’Drv.sys’ reads a page with zero present bit and 
CPU raises a #PF exception. CPU processes this 
#PF by passing control to the code of page fault 
handler via IDT, which stores a link to its code. 
We can then replace the original page fault 
handler or its code and add a new processing 
algorithm. In the page fault handler code, we can 
receive the saved instruction pointer 
(SourceAddr), faulting address (DestinationAddr) 
and with this information we can realize various 
processing algorithms.  
We will consider the following three scenarios of 
page fault handler code. 
Scenario 1. Protecting secret data from being 
read. To protect secret data from unauthorized 
reading we clear P bit in the secret page PTE. 
During reading from this page the #PF (page not 
present fault) will be raised and page fault 
handler code starts to go (Eranian & Mosberger, 
2002). We can update the page fault handler 
algorithm to filter this access violation in the 
appropriate way using the saved instruction 
pointer as SourceAddr and faulting address as 
DestinationAddr. As a result, we are able to 
return the ‘fake’ page to the caller. 
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Figure 3 Log and manage access to memory pages by setting corresponding page table entry as non-present 
and replacing the page fault handler  
 
Scenario 2. Protecting system data from being 
modified. To protect the memory pages from 
unauthorized modification, for example by 
providing the integrity of the system structures, 
we clear Dirty bit (D bit) in the PTE, which will 
correspond to the page with the system structures. 
During any writing access to this page, CPU will 
raise a #PF (dirty-bit fault). Using a similar 
pathway from scenario 1 we can update the page 
fault handler to process this violation in an 
appropriate manner. 
Scenario 3. Detecting unauthorized code 
execution. Trapping execution appears to be a 
more complicated task, because for IA-32 
architecture there is no way to distinguish the 
execute accesses from read and write. To reveal 
execute accesses we use manipulation from 
Scenario 1, which is applied, adapting the 
proposals of Sparks & Butler (2005). An execute 
access is achieved if SourceAddr and 
DestinationAddr are equal.  
Existing approaches, which mark pages as non-
present and replace the page fault handler can be 
analyzed.  
The idea to control access to the pages by 
trapping page fault exceptions was proposed by 
Backes et al. (2014). This group authors 
attempted to avoid code reuse attacks, and this 
approach prevents programs from reading 
executable memory.  
Another system (Xu et al., 2015) focuses on 
controlled-channel attacks, which extract 
sensitive information from the application. This 
attack is based on restriction access to the 
particular code or the data page by editing the 
page table attributes directly. When the 
application tries to access one of these pages, a 
page fault will occur. When a page fault happens, 
the authors system will log the page fault event, 
and enable access to the page and remove access 
from the previous page. Their system records full 
byte-granular page fault traces of both code and 
data pages.  
The idea of monitoring memory access by page 
level tracking is used in the Omnipack kernel 
driver to detect when the program has removed 
the various layers of packing. Omnipack tracks 
written and written-then-executed memory pages. 
This system enforces a write-xor-execute policy 
(W+X) on the memory pages of the suspicious 
program to detect any attempts to execute the 
generated code during unpacking. A similar idea 
of W+X protection policy is also used in 
SecVisor (Seshadri et al., 2007).  
The method of process' address space protection 
via the mechanism of intercepting each time the 
processor asserts the page fault interrupt to signal 
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the access violation was used in the KLIMAX 
(Stefano, Cristiano, & Bruno, 2011).  
The SPIDER system by Deng, Zhang, & Xu 
(2013) realizes data watch point and enables 
monitoring memory to read/write at any address. 
These workers underline two limitations of 
applying existing techniques based on the page-
level mechanism for trapping execution. First, 
every instruction for fetching or data access in the 
non-present page will cause a page fault. This 
would result in a prohibitively high performance 
overhead. Second, the modified page table and 
page fault handler could still be detected by 
kernel-mode drivers.  
However, this method of trapping memory access 
by using PTE modification and replacing page 
fault handler code has several weaknesses. Sparks 
and Butler (2005) have shown that this method 
does not support 4 megabyte pages and, 
moreover, a replaced page fault handler can be 
easily revealed and this can help to detect this 
method. Due to the fact that page fault handler 
code is an intermediary, memory monitoring will 
have a major impact on the system performance. 
In addition, there are issues of porting this 
method to the CPUs with multiple cores 
(Priyadarshi, 2016).  
The main disadvantage of OS-based methods are 
as follows: they can be easily detected and 
disabled by kernel-mode malware. The 
hypervisor-based methods are relatively stealthier 
and more resilient, but they require a CPU with 
hardware virtualization support.  
2.2. Hypervisor-based Methods 
Methods described in this section require 
hardware virtualization processor features, which 
are enabled in all modern CPUs. The first method 
uses Intel Virtualization Technology (VT-x) 
without any specific features. As a result, this 
method will work even on the legacy Intel Core 2 
CPU. The second method leverages Intel VT-x 
with EPT technology, which can be used with 2nd 
generation of Intel – family i3, i5, and i7. One of 
the recently analyzed papers requires processors 
with support from Intel Processor Trace (PT) 
technology, which is integrated only in newest 
CPUs beginning with 5
th
 generation. 
2.2.1. Handling Page-Fault Exceptions by 
Hypervisor 
This method leverages hardware virtualization 
technology into monitoring access to memory by 
processing the page fault exception. This method, 
like the previous one, modifies the page table 
entries or the attributes of the memory pages, 
access which should be controlled. Any access to 
this page will generate the #PF and cause VM-
exit, which will be handled by the hypervisor, see 
Figure 4.  
To set up the hypervisor for processing #PF we 
need to configure Virtual Machine Control 
Structure (VMCS). This can be achieved by 
setting the 14th bit in the Exception Bitmap from 
VMCS->VM-execution control fields.  
Applying this method, the hypervisor is able to 
catch both SourceAddr and DestinationAddr 
addresses, realizing various security scenarios. 
According to the page, which reveals illegal 
memory access: a hypervisor gets the address of 
the trapped instruction from EIP (Cheng, Ding, & 
Deng, 2013). Some recent examples of this 
method will be given and finally the drawbacks 
of the method will be presented.  
Kuniyasu et al. (2014) proposed the DriverGuard 
hypervisor to protect industrial infrastructure 
systems from Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). 
The authors considered, that most of these threats 
“are zero-day attacks and signature based security 
tools cannot detect these attacks.” Their 
hypervisor “prevents malicious write-access to 
code region that causes Blue Screen of Death of 
Windows, and malicious read- and write- access 
to data region which causes information leakage.” 
DriverGuard manages PTE and changes the 
Present bit (P bit). As a result, all access to the 
page causes a page fault, which is hooked by 
DriverGuard; it analyzes whether the access 
comes from a legitimate code or not. If a 
legitimate code accesses the memory, 
DriverGuard will apply a new stealth breakpoint 
technique using hardware breakpoints in the 
single step mode. It enables single step mode by 
setting Monitor Trap Flag (MTF) bit in the 
VMCS. DriverGuard recognizes the memory 
region with sensitive data using “tag” value. 
Memory regions which are allocated dynamically 
by ExAllocatePoolWithTag with this “tag” value 
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will be protected. Hackers can reveal this “tag” 
value and use the same tag in their malware. The 
authors admitted that page fault is slower than 
software interrupt and “it will make performance 
degradation.”  
Another protection system – MOSKG, which is 
countering kernel rootkits with a secure paging 
mechanism was presented by Yan, Luo, Feng, 
Pan, & Safi (2015e). The primary goal of this 
paper is to prevent rootkits by preserving critical 
kernel mode data from being manipulated by 
DKOM and page mapping attacks. These authors 
underline the main challenges as “the dynamic 
data can be modified legally by the OS or 
illegally by using the rootkits, but we have to 
distinguish the legal operations from the illegal 
ones.” To validate the legitimacy of write 
operation to dynamic data and page mapping 
operations they make use of the shadow page 
tables (SPTs) in the hypervisor to mark the 
machine page, which in turn contains the 
protected data as read only. As a result, 
“whenever an instruction attempts to write the 
marked page, the page fault handler in the 
hypervisor will be called.” They underline the 
limitations of their solution, one of which is “that 
the extent of protection is not sufficient.” The 
next limitation is that “the rootkits may seek out 
other unprotected data to compromise the target 
OS. These attacks might be able to circumvent 
some portions of MOSKG architecture.”  
Wang & Jiang (2010) consider the issue of 
hypervisor integrity protection. They assume 
there is a threat model in which attackers are able 
to exploit software vulnerabilities to overwrite 
any memory data. They focused on the 
hypervisors and that “in current hypervisors (e.g., 
Xen and KVM) and OS kernels (e.g. Windows 
and Linux), their page tables are all writable.” 
Experiments have shown that modification of 
“even one bit in a page table entry could well be 
enough to subvert the entire protection.” The 
authors proposed HyperSafe, a lightweight 
approach, which protects the hypervisor’s code 
and data from being compromised. To provide 
the W+X-based integrity HyperSafe marks the 
page tables as read-only and turns on the Write 
Protect bit (WP) in the register CR0. This bit 
controls the way a hypervisor code interacts with 
the write protection bits. As a result, any write 
attempts to modify them at runtime will be 
trapped by the hypervisor. HyperSafe is able to 
protect only open source hypervisor. The support 
of closed source 3rd party drivers still remains a 
major challenge. 
 
Figure 4 Controlling access to the guest OS virtual memory via marking corresponding page table entry 
as a non-present and handling page fault exceptions by hypervisor 
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Patents exist which also cover memory tracking 
ideas by marking guest kernel page table entries 
as not present and controlling page fault. A patent 
by Dang, Mohinder, & Srivastava (2015) 
proposes a hypervisor’s page fault handler, which 
may conditionally allow or deny access to or 
execution of the appropriate guest kernel pages. 
Using the fact that the assignee of this patent is 
McAfee, Inc. from Santa Clara, California 
(USA), we can infer that this methodology is 
used in the McAfee Antivirus or its internal 
products. In another patent (Traut, Hendel, & 
Vega, 2007) the processing interrupts to maintain 
the modified flags of the page table entries and 
this is a significant source of the slowdown for a 
shadow page table implementation.  
Page fault protection mechanism is used for 
monitoring the access to kernel-mode pages but 
also to user-mode pages. U-HIPE is the prototype 
for user-mode memory protection, which injects a 
page fault in the guest VM (Luțaș, et al., 2016).  
Srivastava & Giffin (2011) explore the idea of 
monitoring untrusted kernel-mode execution by 
separating page tables for data and for drivers. 
This separation forces all control flows spanning 
the kernel-driver interface to induce page faults 
which are then handled by the code in the 
hypervisor and this verifies the legitimacy of the 
control flow. As a result, a hypervisor-based 
system called Gateway was created. This system 
traces the behavior of kernel malware by 
monitoring kernel APIs functions invoked by 
drivers.  
A similar method for processing page faults was 
used in the hypervisor-based system HyperSleuth 
for tracing system calls (Martignoniey al 2010). 
Because all system calls invocations go through a 
common gate, whose address is defined by 
SYSENTER_EIP register, these workers shadow 
the values of this register and the value of the 
shadow copy to the address of a non-existent 
memory location. Afterwards, all system calls 
invocations result in a page fault exception. As a 
result, HyperSleuth traps and saves all system 
calls to the log, which is then transmitted via the 
network to the trusted host.  
Another idea is trapping system calls using a 
virtual machine introspection mechanism (Pfoh, 
et al., 2011). This Nitro system works with the 
following system calls: user defined interruption; 
and SYSCALL / SYSENTER instructions. This 
system is not able to monitor function calls in the 
kernel-mode.  
Azab et al. (2009) present a hypervisor-based 
system that measures the integrity of virtual 
machines – HIMA. The idea of protecting guest 
memory using page access permissions was also 
used in the HIMA. This author’s system applies 
facilities of No eXecute bit (NX bit) of a page 
table entry. If this bit is 1, the page is assumed to 
only retain data. Any instruction execution on this 
page will cause a page fault exception, which will 
be trapped by the hypervisor. Moreover, the 
authors proposed to prevent programs from 
marking executable pages as non-writable, which 
provides trapping of any modification of the 
memory pages.  
This memory trapping method is also used in 
PhD research. Thus Yan (2013) deals with 
malware analysis by virtualization and 
demonstrates that this memory monitoring 
method is not resilient for Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attack. The problem is that malware can 
induce a large number of page faults exceptions, 
and each of them involves an exit to the 
hypervisor. This exception flood launches a DoS 
attack on the recorded log and renders its further 
analysis difficult.  
As well as this DoS vulnerability this method has 
the following drawbacks: 
 It is not stealthy: the modification of page 
attributes or PTE.flags is visible from a 
guest and can be easily revealed by 
malware;  
 It is not lightweight: each page fault will 
take some time for processing and in real 
time will result in significant 
performance overheads;  
 It does not fully support multi-core CPU: 
since a PTE exists only for a page and is 
shared by all cores, its modification it 
affects other processors' contexts as well. 
In the next section we will present other methods, 
which exclude these drawbacks, but require CPU 
with VT-x and EPT support.  
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2.2.2. Leverages Intel Extended Page Tables 
technology 
This section covers Intel VT-x with Extended 
Page Tables (EPT) technology, which is a new 
feature of hardware virtualization. We present the 
details of how EPT mechanism is working and 
the ways of leveraging EPT for tracking and 
trapping access to the memory. 
New hardware virtualization feature – EPT is 
the source of inspiration for monitoring 
memory access. 
There are two serious drawbacks of Intel VT-x 
technology presented in the previous section. 
Firstly, there is hypervisor performance overhead 
associated with memory management and 
secondly the size of guest physical memory is 
limited by host physical memory. The idea of 
Second Layer Address Translation (SLAT) or 
Two-Dimensional Paging has been designed to 
reduce the memory and power overhead costs 
through hardware optimization of the page table 
management.  
The SLAT technology has been integrated in the 
Intel CPUs since Nehalem microarchitecture in 
the first Core i3, i5, and i7. In Intel terminology 
this technology is ‘Intel VT-x with Extended 
Page Tables (EPT)’. Similar technology has been 
issued by AMD and this is called ‘Nested Page 
Table (NPT)’. In this review the focus is on EPT 
implementation in the Intel CPUs, but the 
findings apply more generally as well.  
We will show how the EPT mechanism works 
and how it can be used for monitoring memory. 
EPT technology helps to virtualize guest physical 
memory and as a result enhances CPU facilities 
using paging data structures also known as ‘EPT 
layout’. The algorithm of the EPT data structures, 
which translates the guest physical address to the 
host physical address, is similar to the familiar 
algorithm of paging structures in the protected 
mode, which translates the guest virtual address 
to the guest physical address. The content and 
organization of EPT paging structures are 
analogous to the paging structure in the protected 
mode or x86-64 page tables. There are however 
several differences between the content of EPT 
and guest paging structures (Grehan, 2014).  
EPT paging structures include the following 
tables: Page Map Level 4 (EPT PML4), Page-
Directory-Pointer Table (EPT PDPT), Page 
Directory (EPT PD), and Page Table (EPT PT), 
as shown in Figure 5. Hypervisor needs to 
allocate memory for all these tables and place   
their content. Using differing configurations of 
EPT structures the hypervisor can provide various 
memory paging scenarios.  
In this paper we will consider a simple scenario 
with ‘memory 1:1 mapping’, which translates 
guest physical address into the same physical 
address (Uty, & Saman, 2016).  
During each memory access inside guest 
operating system (guest OS), initially the guest 
paging data structures are involved. Finally, the 
EPT structures are to convert the received guest 
physical address into the host physical address.  
We can intercept memory access to the page by 
modifying the bits in the corresponding entry in 
the EPT Page table, while the entries in other 
tables EPT PML4, EPT PDPT, and EPT PD have 
their own default values.  
EPT Page Table entry provides bits, which allow 
or disallow access to the corresponding page: 
 bit#0 – “Read Access”, indicates whether 
reads are allowed from the 4-KByte page;  
 bit#1 – “Write Access”, indicates 
whether writes are allowed from the 4-
KByte page;  
 bit#2 – “Execute Access”, shows whether 
instruction fetches are allowed from the 
4-KByte page.  
According to the Intel manual (Intel, 2016) – 
‘Any attempts at disallowed accesses will involve 
EPT violation and will cause VM exits’. 
Hypervisor intercepts each EPT violation (VM 
Exit) and can implement specific algorithms, 
which help to provide cyber security as well as 
hiding malware data in the memory. 
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Figure 5 Controlling access to the guest OS virtual memory via using second layer address translation 
 
 
Hypervisor can log any read and write memory 
access of the malware driver by resetting the first 
two bits of its EPT PT entry. It is able to protect 
the privacy of its memory page content by 
resetting bit#0 of its EPT PT entry and replacing 
the required physical page to another null page 
where the access is disallowed. Hypervisor is also 
able to provide the integrity of memory page by 
resetting bit#1 and trapping each write access to 
the page. Rootkit hypervisor can protect the 
malicious driver from antiviruses and Windows 
built-in security mechanisms such as PatchGuard. 
For example, to protect secret data on Page B 
from reading by Drv.sys, which is loaded on Page 
A we need to modify the bit 0 in EPT PT entry, 
which corresponds to the page B.  
In the next section we review the papers, which 
leverage EPT technology, and also comment on 
their drawbacks. 
Analysis of EPT-based cyber security solutions 
First, the dynamic analysis system – DRAKVUF 
is able to track execution and tackle DKOM 
attacks (Lengyel et al., 2014). The DRAKVUF 
system uses VT-x and EPT technologies and is 
built on Xen hypervisor and the LibVMI library. 
The core technique is based on writing the 
opcode 0xСС at the code location deemed of 
interest. This manipulation is named as 
breakpoint injection and is trapped by the 
DRAKVUF hypervisor. This technique is able to 
automate the execution tracking of the entire OS 
and can trap all kernel functions. The breakpoint 
injection technique is protected by EPT page 
permission and enables an active virtual machine 
introspection. DRAKVUF adopted a novel 
approach to tackle DKOM attacks. To locate 
internal kernel structures DRAKVUF traps kernel 
heap allocations directly by using breakpoint 
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injection for Windows functions, which are 
responsible for allocating memory for structures: 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag and ObCreateObject. 
This system detects the locating of all kernel 
structures by dynamically extracting the return 
address from the stack. Another interesting 
feature of DRAKVUF system is to monitor 
access to the file by tracking access to the 
corresponding _FILE_OBJECTs structure in the 
kernel-mode heap. DRAKVUF marks the page 
on which the structure is allocated as non-
writable using EPT technology. This monitoring 
systems supports only Windows 7 in both 32 and 
64-bit versions (Drakvuf, 2016). 
In a second monitoring system CXPInspector by 
Willems, Hund, & Holz (2012) focuses on the 
analyzing of the state of a virtual machine from 
the outside. This system is based on the concept 
of Currently eXecutable Pages (CXP), which has 
the capability to observe the behavior of a 
program or even a complete OS and has two main 
uses. Firstly, it helps to analyze the behavior of 
kernel-mode malware and, secondly, it provides a 
performance profile of a single program or a 
whole OS. The authors leverage the EPT 
technology by virtualizing the memory 
management unit, and guarantees address space 
separation and hence it no longer requires 
hooking the page fault handler. The authors 
proposed an innovative approach of trapping 
access to the memory pages, which has instead 
been delegated out to the disk. To handle this 
situation CXPInspector injects a page fault into 
the guest OS, and this in turn forces the guest’s 
page fault handler to page-in the required 
memory. It uses a single step mode by setting 
Trap flag (TF) in the EFLAGS register. 
CXPInspector is based exclusively on the use of 
EPT technology for tracing instruction fetches. 
CXPInspector monitors execution code by 
marking certain pages as non-executable. 
CXPInpector enriches generated logs with 
detailed information about the called functions 
and their argument values. The called function 
names are retrieved through the use of debug 
symbol information. The key feature of 
CXPInspector is its ability to record the memory 
addresses from which call/return originated. This 
becomes possible through the use of Intel 
Processor Trace (Intel PT) technology, which has 
been integrated into Intel CPU since their 5th 
generation. CXPInspector is implemented on 
KVM hypervisor, which provides an interface to 
the QEMU toolset for 64 bit machines and 
Windows 7.  
The next paper by Pham et al., (2014) proposed 
the design of a HyperTap, a hypervisor-level 
framework, which monitors a variety of system 
events and states. HyperTap is able to trap 
context switching, syscalls, instruction execution 
and memory accesses. HyperTap can be adapted 
for a wide range of reliability and security (RnS) 
policies. HyperTap protection algorithms are 
based on setting memory protection for the 
allocated Memory Mapped I/O area so that access 
to this area will trigger EPT_VIOLATION 
events. We focus on two main examples of 
applying HyperTap: (1) Hidden RootKit 
Detection (HRKD) and (2) Privilege Escalation 
Detection (PED). In order to detect a hidden user 
process or thread, HyperTap tracks thread 
switches by setting memory access permissions. 
The HRKD sets all memory pages that contain 
TSS structure as write-protected. As a result, each 
thread switch modifies the task state segment 
(TSS) structure, which is then rerouted to the 
hypervisor using EPT_VIOLATION. The 
algorithm of PED is based on the Ninja privilege 
detection systems. PED applies OS-level Ninja’s 
checking rules whilst screening for unauthorized 
access. The idea behind this is to intercept fast 
system calls by using execute-protection on the 
system call entry point so that a guest attempt to 
execute this system call will generate 
EPT_VIOLATION. HyperTap is based on the 
KVM hypervisor and Linux kernel. These 
protection mechanisms have been tested on 
Windows XP, Vista, and 7.  
The idea of applying hypervisors facilities and 
EPT technology for rootkit purposes has been 
reported by Uty & Saman, (2016). These authors 
focus on the invisible inline hooks aimed at the 
modification of the code section. Hypervisor 
maps guest physical address to the host physical 
addresses by using 1:1 mapping. The idea of 
using invisible inline hooks is based on copying 
physical aspects and the original page. This 
memory page copy evades any detection of 
integrity violation. Thus in order to hook the 
Windows internal function the authors inject 
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0xСС (breakpoint, #BP) into the original page, 
while the duplicated page becomes unpatched. 
The memory page with this inline hook therefore 
will have an executable page permission. Any 
read operation to this page will trigger the EPT 
violation and during its processing the hypervisor 
changes the page’s mapping to the shadow one 
with read-write permissions. To speed up the 
authors proposed the use of two slightly different 
EPT structures and then simply switch between 
them. Using the idea of invisible inline hooks, the 
author has realized the keylogger and bypassed 
PatchGuard. In the first case authors hooked the 
KeyboardClassServiceCallBack routine and in 
the second case to hide a process they hooked to 
NtQuerySystemInformation. These hypervisor-
based rootkits facilities have been successfully 
tested on Windows 7 x64 and Windows 8.1 x64.  
We can see that there are the following 
drawbacks of these EPT-based studies: 
 EPT technology operates on page 
granularity level, which is why all these 
studies proposed a page-level control, 
without fine-grained analysis;  
 There is no solution which is able to 
monitor and control all possible memory 
access simultaneously: read, write, and 
execute;  
 All analyzed security solutions are not 
flexible because they are based on huge 
platforms, such as Xen, KVM, QEMU 
etc. 
We can conclude that EPT technology provides a 
huge opportunity to monitor and control access to 
the memory pages, and this can be used as the 
basis for the proposed solution. 
2.3. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that the existing 
memory monitoring methods have the following 
drawbacks:  
1. Both OS-based methods are vulnerable to 
kernel-mode malware manipulations.  
2. Methods based on handling page fault 
violations via bare-metal hypervisor are 
not lightweight and will not support 
multi-core CPUs properly.  
3. EPT-based methods provide neither a 
fine-grained analysis nor the ability to 
trap all memory access.  
The summary with the comparison analysis of the 
major papers and projects is given in the Table 2, 
where 2nd generation CPU supports VT-x and 
EPT technologies – Nehalem microarchitecture. 
5th generation CPU supports VT-x, EPT, and PT 
technologies – Broadwell microarchitecture. 
In the next section we will present 
MemoryMonRWX, which is said to be free from 
all above mentioned drawbacks. 
  
Table 2 Summary table of memory monitoring projects  
Title, year 
Controlling the type of access 
Supported OS 
Required CPU 
Generation Read Write Execute 
HIMA, 2009 – – + only Linux 2nd 
HyperSleuth, 2010 + – – Windows 7, 8, x64 2nd 
CXPInspector, 2013 – – + Windows 7 x64 5th 
SPIDER, 2013 + + – only Linux 2nd 
DRAKVUF, 2014 – – + Windows 7 x64 2nd 
HyperTap, 2014 – + + Windows XP, Vista, 7 2nd 
MemoryMonRWX, 2017 + + + Windows 7-10 x64 2nd 
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3. DESIGN OF MEMORYMONRWX – THE 
MEMORY MONITOR HYPERVISOR  
In this section we present the main new 
contributions of this paper. This part covers the 
proposed ideas of how to apply EPT technology 
to trap and manage memory access, and also the 
design of a proposed hypervisor-based memory 
monitoring system, which is able to 
simultaneously track all types of memory access: 
read, write, and execute. We have named it the 
MemoryMonRWX system – which stands for 
Memory Monitor of Read, Write, and eXecute 
access.This system registers read and write access 
to the specific range of virtual memory addresses 
as well as revealing executable code on these 
memory pages. This system supports multi-core 
processors and consequently runs itself on each 
core.  
This is the first memory monitoring system which 
can trap even one-byte modification of guest OS, 
while all other solutions work on page granularity 
level. MemoryMonRWX did well when tested on 
the latest Windows 10 14393 x64 system. 
3.1. How to Apply EPT-Technology to Trap 
and Control Memory Access 
Modern malware and spyware rootkits apply the 
following typical techniques to protect 
themselves from being detected: malware can 
read and modify the content of data and code in 
the memory. 
There are two main scenarios. First we can 
monitor memory access from a suspicious driver, 
which is loaded from known addresses range. In 
the second scenario access to the suspicious 
memory addresses is controlled. To cover these 
two cases MemoryMonRWX needs to monitor 
and control access by using source address range 
(SRC range) and destination address range (DST 
range). MemoryMonRWX skips accesses from 
all other ranges (OTH range). In this paper SRC 
range, DST range, and OTH range do not 
intersect and this sum (SRC range + DST range + 
OTH range) is in the entire virtual context. SRC 
range includes virtual addresses, access from 
which will be trapped and DST range includes 
virtual address, access to which will be trapped. 
MemoryMonRWX controls memory access only 
from the SRC range to DST range and skips all 
other accesses. 
To provide such surveillance we apply a new 
Intel VT-x with Extended Page Table (EPT) 
technology, which significantly expands the 
existing bare-metal hypervisor facilities.  Some 
details of EPT technology were given above in 
section 2.2.2. In a nutshell, by applying EPT 
paging structures, EPT technology provides a 
mechanism which can intercept and control 
access to the memory pages. 
Using EPT structures we can implement the 
control of memory access from the SRC range to 
DST range and skip all other accesses, see 
Figure 6 a). Once guest memory is accessed, the 
translation between guest virtual address (GVA) 
to guest physical address (GPA) occurs, as shown 
in arrow (1) in Figure 6 below. After page walk is 
completed, the translation between GPA to host 
physical address (HPA) occurs, as shown in 
arrow (2). We receive HPA during page walk via 
EPT structures, which are used as an 
intermediary. If this memory access is allowed by 
the EPT, PT entry access bits, hypervisor does 
not take control. If this memory access is 
disallowed according to the EPT page table 
access bits, it involves EPT violation and causes 
VM exit, as shown by arrow (3). Now hypervisor 
is able to log and control access to this memory 
page via modification of EPT paging structures, 
see arrow (4). After that control goes to physical 
memory (5) and comes back to the guest, see 
arrows (6), (7), (8). 
Let us consider two main scenarios of using EPT 
structures. Firstly, we set allowing attributes in 
the EPT structures and hypervisor does not trap 
anything, see Figure 6 b). Secondly, to intercept 
each read-access to the guest page we change the 
attributes on the corresponding EPT PT entry, see 
Figure 6 c).  
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a) b) c) 
Figure 6 Algorithm of intercepting memory access using EPT: a) General view;  
b) EPT structures have allowed attributes; c) EPT structures have disallowed attributes 
 
These two scenarios can be combined in the 
following way, which includes 5 steps. We 
control memory access from SRC range by 
resetting execute attributes in the corresponding 
EPT structures. Next we filter all these accesses 
to the DST range by resetting read- write- execute 
attributes in the EPT structures, which correspond 
to DST range. 
Step 1 (Trapping SRC range execution). To 
separate only desired access from all other ones 
we use the following EPT structure as a trap, see 
Figure 7 a). 
This structure helps to intercept only execution 
access from SRC range, while all other accesses 
are skipped. This is an EPT normal view 
structure. In this structure DST range and OTH 
range will not be relevant. As a result, any code 
execution on SRC range involves EPT violation 
and causes VM Exit, and so we move on to 
Step 2. 
Step 2 (VM-Exit, because of execution on 
SRC). To understand what this code is trying to 
achieve, we use the following EPT structure as a 
trap, see Figure 7 b). Actually we can use only 
one EPT structure, but it requires updating each 
time during the change of the EPT pointer.  
With this EPT structure the hypervisor will 
receive a VM Exit only if the code, which has 
been trapped on Step 1, is trying to access the 
DST range. This is in the EPT monitor view 
structure. Now any access to the DST range 
generates a VM Exit again and we move on to 
Step 3.  
Step 3 (VM-Exit, because of access to DST). At 
this point, control goes to the hypervisor again. If 
we need to trap and monitor memory access, we 
log all related information: SCR address, DST 
address, type of access (read/write/execute), byte 
values some of which may have been read or 
overwritten. But if we need to protect sensitive 
data (or code) from being read or prevent 
important data (or code) from being overwritten 
we apply the following 3 procedures: 
1. Change EPT.PFN value of the secret 
page to another one, for example, to the 
null page.  
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2. Allow access to this page by setting 
‘true’ to EPT.DST.read and 
EPT.DST.write.  
3. Set Monitor Trap Flag (MTF). 
Setting this flag enables the system to generate 
VM Exit system after executing each instruction 
(Zhu, 2014). After guest OS reads the replaced 
page and executes just one instruction, the control 
goes to the hypervisor, because of VM Exit, and 
we move on to Step 4. 
Step 4 (VM-Exit, because of MTF). By now we 
will have protected the secret data (or code) from 
being read and tampered with. To get ready to 
intercept a new memory access, we restore the 
configuration by applying the following 3 
procedures: 
1. Restore EPT.PFN value to the original 
one.  
2. Restore permission of EPT.DST.read and 
EPT.DST.write by setting ‘false’ value.  
3. Clear the MTF. 
After that any access to the DST range will 
generate VM-Exit, and we move on to Step 3. 
Any execute access on OTH range will also 
generate VM-Exit, and we move on to Step 5. 
Step 5 (VM-Exit, because of execution on 
OTH). Now we check if this VM Exit address 
belongs to the SRC range. If it does not, it means 
that this code is out of our control and so we do 
not have to control it. So we change EPT back 
from monitor view to normal view in order to be 
ready to trap a new code execution on SRC range, 
we move on to Step 1.  
The interaction between these five steps is 
presented in Table 3 and Figure 8.  
We checked the proposed idea of using EPT to 
control memory access by developing a 
MemoryMonRWX hypervisor, which is 
presented in the next section. 
  
a) b) 
Figure 7 The content of EPT structures: a) EPT normal view, b) EPT monitor view 
Table 3 Summary table of VM-Exit manipulations if access address belongs to SRC range 
Type of Access 
Current Address 
Inside DST Range Outside DST Range 
Read / Write VM-exit & Recorded Nothing 
Execution 
VM-exit & Recorded &  
Switch to Normal View 
VM-exit &  
Switch to Normal View 
 SRC.read = true 
 SRC.write = true
 SRC.exec = false
(any execution access generates VM-Exit)
 DST.read = true
 DST.write = true
 DST.exec = true
 OTH.read = true
 OTH.write = true
 OTH.exec = true
EPT Normal View
 SRC.read = true 
 SRC.write = true
 SRC.exec = true 
 DST.read = false
(any read access generates VM-Exit)
 DST.write = false
(any write access generates VM-Exit)
 DST.exec = false
(any execution access generates VM-Exit)
 OTH.read = true
 OTH.write = true
 OTH.exec = false
(any execution access generates VM-Exit)
EPT Monitor View
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Figure 8 The proposed interaction between EPT views to log and control memory access 
 
3.2. Architecture and Major Components 
We have developed a hardware based hypervisor 
– MemoryMonRWX (Tanda, 2016-a), which 
leverages two Intel technologies: VT-x and Intel 
VT-x with EPT. MemoryMonRWX includes the 
following components: HyperPlatform, Image 
Load Detector, Source/Destination Range 
Manager (Src/Dst Range Manager), Virtual-to-
Physical Map Manager (V2P Map Manager), and 
EPT controller.  
A summary of the way this system works is 
shown in Figure 9. HyperPlatform is the main 
component of this system, which is a bare-metal 
hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM). 
HyperPlatform is a minimal hypervisor, which is 
specifically designed for intercepting a variety of 
events in the guest OS and was firstly presented 
in REcon conference in 2016 (Tanda & Korkin, 
2016).  
After the MemoryMonRWX has been loaded, 
Image Load Detector forms a SRC/DST memory 
range of guest virtual memory addresses. Image 
Load Detector includes both type of ranges: pre-
configured ranges, which include, for example, 
the addresses of critical memory areas and the 
addresses of recently loaded drivers, which are 
added automatically. In this situation, the 
addresses of recently loaded drivers are SRC 
addresses and DST addresses and these are 
critical memory areas. It is possible to specify 
your own set of SRT and DST ranges by 
modifying the code of MemoryMonRWX.  
Src/Dst Range Manager takes requests from the 
Image Load Detector with SRC/DST virtual 
addresses ranges. This manager asks the EPT 
controller to update EPT settings for the stored 
ranges so that VM-Exit occurs when guest OS 
drivers from SRC ranges attempt to access any of 
the DST ranges.  
V2P Map Manager maintains the mapping of 
virtual (VA) to physical addresses (PA). This 
manager takes requests for addition VAes from 
both SRC and DST ranges and stores them along 
with their corresponding PAes. Once any of 
following events occurs, HyperPlatform, requests 
V2P Map Manager to check whether any pair of 
VA:PA needs to be refreshed: translation 
Lookaside Buffer (TLB) flush; completion of #PF 
occurs due to access to the non-present page. 
init
Step 5
EPT normal view
EPT monitor view
EPT monitor view with
 Replaced EPT.DST.PFN
 EPT.DST.read=true
EPT.DST.write=true
 MTF=true
Step 4Step 3
Step 2
Step 1
EPT pointer
VMCS
. . .
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TLB flush indicates that any of previously valid 
VA:PA mapping via the page table entry has been 
changed, as for example, when the VA page is 
paged-out. The latter indicates that a new VA:PA 
mapping has just been established, for example, 
in case of paged-in page. V2P Map Manager will 
update the pair of VA:PA mapping in both cases.  
EPT controller manipulates the guest OS 
behavior during the access to/from the configured 
memory regions. EPT controller is responsible 
for initializing and updating the EPT Paging Data 
Structures, handling EPT violation, and recording 
memory access. First, EPT controller accepts 
requests for updating the EPT setting from 
Src/Dst Range Manager for SRC and DST 
ranges. Second, EPT controller updates EPT 
Paging Data. Structures of a given range to 
trigger VM-Exit when this range is accessed. 
Third, EPT controller is notified by 
HyperPlatform, when VM-Exit has occurred via 
the mechanism of EPT violation. EPT controller 
checks whether the access should be logged by 
asking if the accessed VA is inside the DST 
ranges and the current code counter, for example, 
if the value of RIP register, is within the SRC 
range.  
MemoryMonRWX provides fine-grained analysis 
by intercepting an access to the memory page. 
The logging process is only done when an EPT 
violation has occurred only on the configured 
address range. We do not log the accesses 
attempts to the EPT controlled pages, which do 
not belong to the configured ranges of memory 
addresses. 
 
Figure 9 Architecture and Major Components of MemoryMonRWX 
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MemoryMonRWX traps access to the configured 
SRC and DST address ranges using two EPT 
paging structures: EPT normal view and EPT 
monitor view, see Figure 9. Note that each 
processor has those two structures so that multi-
core systems can be supported. The normal view 
is used for the default state and the monitoring 
view is used when a guest is inside an SRC range. 
Details about the configuration and interaction 
between EPT normal view and EPT monitor view 
are given above in Section 3.1. 
During processing MemoryMonRWX saves its 
log into the file C:\Windows\MemoryMon.log.  
An example of this log is present in Figure 10 a). 
The first line indicates that a virtual address 
FFFFFA800194A468 is executed and its 
potential return address is FFFFF80002AD8C1C. 
Since execution of a non-image region is not 
always triggered by the CALL instruction, a 
reported return address can be wrong. For 
instance, the last line reports return address 
0000000000000004. The return address is 
calculated in the following way. This address is 
the content of a memory address, specified by 
RSP at the point of EPT violation, 
ReturnAddr=*RSP. Actually, we do not know, 
execution on which this particular instruction has 
been trapped. To reveal the precise call stack we 
are planning to leverage the Intel Processor Trace 
(PT) mechanism. 
To resolve symbol names in this log, a user-mode 
parser has been developed (Tanda, 2016-b). An 
example of a result log is presented in 
Figure 10 b).  
MemoryMonRWX offers good compatibility 
with the all major Windows platforms. For 
instance, MemoryMonRWX supports and can 
monitor Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 on both x86 and 
x64 architectures with more than one core. 
To ensure simplicity of its extension by 
researchers, MemoryMonRWX is designed to be 
small. As shown in Figure 11, it is made up of 
less than 12,000 lines of code, which is less than 
3% of Xen, for example. Also, it can be compiled 
on Visual Studio without requiring any assistance 
from 3rd party libraries. MemoryMonRWX can be 
debugged with WinDbg just like a common 
Windows driver. Moreover, for rapid 
development, C++ and STL can be used if 
preferred. 
We can conclude that the proposed 
MemoryMonRWX system has the following 
competitive advantages. First, it traps any 
accesses – read, write, and execute even to as 
little as one byte in the memory. It occurs due to 
leveraging EPT technology, which provides only 
page granularity level, and further processing, 
which reveals access even to one byte. Second, it 
supports multi-core processors via activating the 
VMX mode on each core. Finally, this system 
supports the newest Windows 10 14393 x64. 
Also, MemoryMonRWX can function as the 
basis for other cybersecurity solutions, for 
example, to monitor the activities of Device 
Driver Interfaces – DDIMon (Tanda, 2016-c), to 
detect unauthorized elevation of privilege – 
EoPMon (Tanda, 2016-d) as well as providing a 
mechanism to research and deactivate the 
PatchGuard – GuardMon (Tanda, 2016-e; Tanda, 
2016-f, and Tanda, 2016-g). 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Figure 10 Fragments of MemoryMonRWX log: a) raw data b) parsed data with resolved symbols names 
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Figure 11 Comparison in lines of code of hypervisor projects,  
MemoryMonRWX is made up of less than 12,000 lines of code, which is less than 3% of Xen 
 
3.3. Three Demos of MemoryMonRWX 
This sections covers three demonstrations of 
applying the MemoryMonRWX system. In the 
first example MemoryMonRWX stops the 
activity of a privilege escalation kernel mode 
exploit by detecting writing and causing BSOD. 
The second case demonstrates the read protection 
ability of MemoryMonRWX to prevent 
PatchGuard from being disabled. The final case 
deals with applying MemoryMonRWX to detect 
a suspicious code execution using Turla rootkit as 
an example. 
3.3.1. Integrity Case – MemoryMonRWX 
Prevents Modifications of Code & Data 
Typical kernel-mode rootkits hook functions 
through rewriting a code and unlink their 
structures by DKOM. The main scheme of these 
attacks is shown in Figure 12. These attacks are 
also known as Semantic Value Manipulation 
(SVM) attacks. These can mislead security tools 
by manipulating data values directly in the kernel 
data structures. Similar attacks are proposed by 
Prakash, et al., (2015). 
The proposed MemoryMonRWE is able to detect 
and prevent such attacks. As an example we 
consider the CVE-2014-0816 kernel mode exploit 
(Tanda, 2016-h), which modifies its value in the 
HalDispatchTable[1]. To do it we predefined 
ranges in MemoryMonRWE; set address of 
HalDispatchTable[1] as a destination address. As 
a result, after loading the exploit 
MemoryMonRWE traps this modification and 
this is then able to stop the guest OS which 
prevents further exploitation. The video 
demonstration of this case is shown in Tanda 
(2016-i). 
MemoryMonRWX can also be used to guarantee 
the integrity of critical kernel-mode sections, 
system lists, as well as the integrity of configured 
ranges to protect proprietary programs and their 
data. In this case MemoryMonRWX plays the 
role of future HyperGuard (Hyper Guard), which 
will probably replace the existing and vulnerable 
PatchGuard system (Ionescu, 2015; Chauhan, 
2016). 
3.3.2. Confidentiality Case – 
MemoryMonRWX Prevents Reading Data 
Memory content includes much sensitive 
information: keystrokes, passwords, their hashes, 
private cryptographic keys, and even the 
fragments of decrypted data. Various rootkits 
attacks focus on kernel-level memory disclosure. 
The scheme of these attacks is given in Figure 13. 
A description of the attacks of crypto key 
disclosure in the OpenSSH, Nginx server, and 
CryptoLoop is considered in Liu et al., (2015). A 
memory-based keylogger, which intercepts 
keystrokes by reading the content of 
DEVICE_EXTENSION of the kbdhid.sys driver, 
has been proposed by Ladakis et al., (2013). 
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Figure 12 Code and data modifications attacks in the kernel-mode memory 
 
 
Figure 13 Spyware driver reads and steals sensitive data 
 
To demonstrate that MemoryMonRWX has the 
ability to prevent read-access to sensitive data in 
the memory we use another kernel-mode exploit 
“Disarms PatchGuard (DisPG)”, as has been 
proposed by Tanda (2016-j). One of the 
components of DisPG reads the value from 
nt!PoolBigPageTableSize, which stores the 
address of the big page pool table Sylve, et al., 
(2016). To prevent such unauthorized reading we 
predefined the MemoryMonRWX destination 
range using the address of 
nt!PoolBigPageTableSize and also changed the 
logic of intercepting in the following way: Thus 
any unauthorized reading access attempts to this 
memory content will be redirected to a fake zero 
page. As a result, DisPG reads the replaced fake 
zero value and fails to disable PatchGuard. Video 
demonstration of this case is loaded in (Tanda, 
2016-k).  
Thus MemoryMonRWE prevents any 
unauthorized reading access of the sensitive data. 
3.3.3. Real World Case – Applying 
MemoryMonRWX to Analyze Turla Rootkit 
Another rootkit technique moves malware 
executable code outside the driver section. As a 
result, kernel memory includes unknown pages 
with an executable code.  
MemoryMonRWX is able to reveal such 
executable code as well as providing facilities to 
analyze it with the help of a disassembler. To 
demonstrate these facilities, we use Turla rootkit 
(also known as Uroburos rootkit).  
We tested MemoryMonRWX on the 64bit 
version of Windows 7 against the Turla rootkit 
and confirmed that MemoryMonRWX is able to 
detect execution of non-paged pool and that the 
executed region contained unpacked rootkit code 
(Tanda, 2016-l). 
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3.4. Benchmarks 
Performance measurement was conducted on the 
64bit version of Windows 10 running on a 
Macbook Air with Intel Core i7-4650U, 8GB 
RAM and SSD flash storage. In this experiment, 
we executed Novabench (Novabench, n.d.) and 
PCMark8 Home (PCMark8, n.d.) on the system 
with and without MemoryMonRWX. Compared 
overhead in ratio is shown in Figure 14. We can 
measure how much the system performance 
changed in comparison to 0%, which indicates 
the system operating without those hypervisor 
tools.  
The results showed that performance degradation 
kept to less than 10% in all tests except the 
Novabench Graphics Tests. We surmise that the 
reason for the higher overhead on this test is 
caused by frequent TLB flush led by active 
memory access, yet this has not been investigated 
so far. Users should experience much less 
overheads during their routine work: opening and 
saving documents or surfing the Internet. 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have achieved the following 
results:  
1) We are able to reveal and prevent 
malicious activity by logging and 
controlling read-, write, and execute- 
memory access in a real time mode.  
2) We developed a MemoryMonRWX 
hypervisor to ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of both code and data. 
This system helps to detect kernel-mode 
malware, even if this malware applies 
popular OS-based prevention techniques. 
3) MemoryMonRWX can be used to 
monitor access to the memory for a 
variety of different purposes: driver 
tracking, reverse engineering, detection 
of unknown malware, verification and 
protection of proprietary software.  
4) We demonstrate that MemoryMonRWX 
can be used in practice, the evaluation of 
its benchmarks shows that its degradation 
is quite small.  
5) MemoryMonRWX is a tiny open-source 
project which can be easily used by 
students and post-graduate students 
during their research activity. 
With regard to future work we would like to 
suggest the following ideas  
 
Figure 14 MemoryMonRWX overhead  
0% indicates the system without hypervisor, 100% – full system overload 
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4.1. Hypervisor-based Warden Controls Access 
to The Memory 
We propose an idea of how to improve PatchGuard 
facilities and make it more resilient. We propose an 
idea for hypervisor-based warden (HyperWarden) 
which is not vulnerable to all kernel-mode malware 
manipulations, because it runs in a more privileged 
mode. Existing PatchGuard provides integrity for 
Windows kernel code and detects unlinking attacks 
on the structures from process and drivers lists 
(Ionescu, 2015). It does not protect the integrity of 
the full content of these structures in the memory 
(Ch40zz, 2015) as well as not providing any 
mechanisms to protect memory of the 3rd party 
drivers from being tampered with. 
HyperWarden will exclude all these drawbacks. It 
will provide flexible protection for all data in the 
memory using MemoryMonRWX as its basis. By 
dynamic configuration of SRC/DST ranges and 
allowed types of memory access we can guarantee 
the data and code security. HyperWarden will avoid 
any modification of critical Windows code and 
multiple structures in the memory. It will allow 
modification and read critical Windows data only 
through the Windows kernel code. To protect the 
integrity and confidentiality of the code and data of 
the third part drivers HyperWarden will provide 
API to configure regions of memory, which need 
be protected. HyperWarden will support functions 
to activate/deactivate memory protection as well as 
adding\deleting protected memory areas for each 
driver. As a result, HyperWarden helps to provide 
complex memory security: protect integrity for OS 
critical areas as well as integrity and confidentiality 
of users for the configured memory areas. 
4.2. Protection of Cloud Computing Systems 
One of the possible scenarios of large scale 
application of MemoryMonRWX is to protect 
Cloud Computing Systems from being tampered by 
exploits and malware (Murakami, 2014). Private 
Cloud Computing Systems such as Amazon, 
Google, and Microsoft provide their clients with 
common services, whose behaviors are little 
altered. For each specific Software as a Service 
(SaaS) we can generate various behavior signatures, 
which correspond to typical operations with 
memory, and in this way avoid the leakage of 
users’ data. 
4.3. Visualize Memory Access 
Another suggestion is to visualize registered 
memory access using various techniques. The idea 
is to create a Dynamic Memory Map, 
demonstrating which driver or code has access to 
specific data in the memory. It may also monitor 
the frequency, amount of accessed data, and the 
content of memory. The first step is to draw a Static 
Memory Map with loaded drivers together with the 
allocated data using rectangles. It will look like a 
typical memory dump. The second step is to trap 
the access from each driver to the memory and then 
draw the corresponding arrow between the two 
blocks. The third step is to continue updating the 
picture and as a result this will show the Dynamic 
Memory Map. For first step we can use various 
data visualization techniques (ISOVIS, n.d.) and for 
the second step we can apply ideas from Rgat roject 
(Catlin, 2016). 
4.4. Apply Raspberry Pi to Acquire Physical 
Memory Dump & Detect Hidden Software 
We propose an idea of using modern IoT platforms 
such as a Raspberry Pi for the protection of 
computers and incident response. The idea is to 
expand the opportunities of CaptureGUARD by 
WindowsSCOPE (WindowsSCOPE, n.d.), which is 
only able to acquire the physical memory dump, 
and so significantly decrease the price of a new 
hardware platform.  
First of all, we can use Raspberry Pi to acquire the 
dump of physical memory using the ExpressCard 
slot for PC and Thunderbolt interface for Mac. A 
tecnhique of dumping memory by FPGA on a 
PCMCIA card or ExpressCard slot was proposed 
by Aumaitre, and Devine, (2010). We are planning 
to apply an Inception software tool, which exploits 
PCI-based DMA. This tool can attack over 
FireWire, Thunderbolt, ExpressCard, PC Card and 
any other PCI/PCIe interfaces (Maartmann-Moe, 
n.d). After dumping we can use Raspberry Pi 
facilities to process this memory dump using Rekall 
Memory Forensic or Volatility Frameworks. We 
can also update detection software using a wireless 
connection, that is built-in to Raspberry Pi. This 
detection platform will also be resilient to malware 
attacks, because users do not work on it. 
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4.5. Implantable Medical Devices as a Target of 
Cyber Attacks 
Another idea is to protect wireless Implantable 
Medical Devices (IMD) from being hijacked using 
remote control. The livelihood and welfare of 
patients ultimately depends on the precise work of 
these devices. Their work can be breached remotely 
by an intruder through using a wireless connection 
and thus can result in human losses. We propose 
the following action plan to protect IMD and make 
forensic investigation easier. We can maintain 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data 
by applying lightweight cryptography to a secure 
channel. We will suggest an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) to protect IMD from DoS attacks by 
disabling its input dispatcher temporarily (Darji & 
Trivedi 2013). IDS will protect battery IMD from 
being drained. We will describe the event logging 
system which is able to perform the forensic 
analysis in case of an incident occurring. Finally, 
we are planning to verify embedded software to 
reveal the vast majority of vulnerabilities.  
As the first step, we will create an analogue of 
OneTouch Ping Glucose Management System & 
Insulin Pump by J&J, which was attacked recently 
(Finkle, 2016). We will apply Contiki OS for 
programming TI MSP430 microcontroller, which is 
used in these pumps. We demonstrate the 
vulnerability of this radio channel by unauthorized 
control and access to this pump. We will develop a 
complex cyber-security system, which will protect 
this IMD from being tampered with remotely, or 
from stealing data and draining the IMD battery by 
wireless DoS attacks. 
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